Most methods for learning causal structures from non-experimental data rely on some assumptions of simplicity, the most famous of which is known as the Faithfulness condition. Without assuming such conditions to begin with, we develop a learning theory for inferring the structure of a causal Bayesian network, and we use the theory to provide a novel justification of a certain assumption of simplicity that is closely related to Faithfulness. Here is the idea. With only the Markov and IID assumptions, causal learning is notoriously too hard to achieve statistical consistency but we show that it can still achieve a quite desirable "combined" mode of stochastic convergence to the truth: having almost sure convergence to the true causal hypothesis with respect to almost all causal Bayesian networks, together with a certain kind of locally uniform convergence. Furthermore, every learning algorithm achieving at least that joint mode of convergence has this property: having stochastic convergence to the truth with respect to a causal Bayesian network N only if N satisfies a certain variant of Faithfulness, known as Pearl's Minimality condition-as if the learning algorithm were designed by assuming that condition. This explains, for the first time, why it is not merely optional but mandatory to assume the Minimality condition-or to proceed as if we assumed it.
Introduction
Suppose that we are interested in a system that can be properly modeled by a causal Bayesian network (CBN) over a given set of observed variables (Spirtes et al. 1993; Pearl 2000) , and we aim to learn the structure of the CBN, but only from non-experimental data (possibly because experimentation is too costly or unethical). Two conditions are assumed. The first is the defining condition for a CBN, the (causal) Markov condition: every variable is probabilistically independent of its noneffects given all of its immediate causes. The second is the IID assumption, that the observations of values of the variables are independent and identically distributed (with respect to the true, unknown joint distribution). This is the learning problem we aim to address-without a further assumption. This is an extremely hard learning problem, so hard that statistical consistency is unachievablenamely, it has no learning algorithm that converges stochastically to the true causal structure (unique up to the so-called Markov equivalence) with respect to every possible CBN. The reason is well-known: two CBNs N 1 and N 2 can have very different (Markov inequivalent) causal structures but share the same joint probability distribution, forcing any learning algorithm to have the same output with the same probability with respect to both CBNs, N 1 and N 2 . So, to have stochastic convergence to the truth with respect to one CBN is to sacrifice it with respect to the other CBNhence the impossibility of statistical consistency. This raises a crucial question we want to address: Which should we sacrifice? The goal of this paper is to answer this question with a new learning theory, all done while making only the IID and Markov assumptions.
The old, standard approach to causal learning theory does not really answer the above question. On that approach, learning theorists should make enough assumptions to restore the possibility of statistical consistency. Specifically, since two CBNs N 1 and N 2 can have very different causal structures but share the same joint probability distribution, those who follow the old approach make an assumption to rule out N 1 or N 2 in order to make statistical consistency possible. To get this job done, Spirtes et al. (1993) propose to assume the now-famous condition of Faithfulness. This practice has been followed by almost all subsequent causal learning theorists, possibly with one variant of Faithfulness or another. But why make that assumption (or the like)? On the old approach, the answer is twofold:
(A) We have to make some assumption besides the IID and Markov assumptions before we can start doing learning theory, because there is no learning theory without the possibility of statistical consistency.
(B) The assumption of Faithfulness (or the like) is "innocuous" in that it fails only on a negligible set of CBNs, a set of Lebesgue measure zero (Spirtes et al. 1993 , Meek 1995 .
But this answer has at least two problems. The first problem is that (B) does not explain why we should make the assumption of Faithfulness (or any particular variant of it). There is an infinite stock of assumptions that fail only on a set of Lebesgue measure zero, and Faithfulness is only one of them. Then why assume this rather than that? This problem is left unsolved on the old approach. The bigger problem with the old approach concerns (A), which we think is a false presupposition about the methodology of learning theory. Learning theory is possible even when statistical consistency is unachievable. We show how by proposing and developing a new methodology:
Step 1. Guideline: When we are tackling a learning problem that is too hard to allow for statistical consistency, don't worry. There are many other modes of stochastic convergence to the truth (and their combinations) for us to explore. Let's explore them and try to find the highest achievable standard.
Main Result: Applying that general guideline to a case study-causal learning without the Faithfulness assumption or the like-we show (in theorem 1) that it is still possible for a causal learning algorithm to achieve a quite desirable standard. It is a "combined" mode of convergence to the truth, which involves:
(i) almost sure convergence with respect to individual CBNs,
(ii) convergence almost everywhere (i.e. everywhere except on a nowhere dense subset) on each space of CBNs generated by a causal hypothesis, (iii) convergence on a maximal domain of CBNs, and (iv) locally uniform convergence of a kind that guarantees that low error probability can be made stable under small perturbations of the joint probability distribution.
Remark: It might be possible to achieve not only (i)-(iv) but strictly more-a very interesting possibility that we cannot explore in this paper. But we submit that the highest achievable standard for causal learning under just the IID and Markov assumptions must imply at least the joint mode of convergence (i)-(iv).
Step 2. Guideline: Determine what it takes for a learning algorithm to achieve at least the joint mode of convergence (i)-(iv).
Main Result: We show (in theorem 1) that every causal learning algorithm L that achieves (i)-(iv) has the following property: converging stochastically to the truth with respect to a CBN N only if N satisfies a condition known as Pearl's (2000) Minimality condition-as if learning algorithm L were designed by assuming that condition. In other words, although it is undeniably a cost to sacrifice convergence to the truth with respect to the CBNs that violate Pearl's Minimality, it is a necessary cost for achieving (i)-(iv), which is, in turn, necessary for achieving the best we can have. Pearl's (2000) Minimality condition is one of several assumptions of simplicity that have been proposed for causal learning. The Faithfulness condition mentioned above is the most famous of them; it says roughly that no fact of conditional independence is left "unexplained" by the true causal structure. Pearl's Minimality condition says something weaker, that only a minimal set of conditional independence facts is left "unexplained" by the true causal structure. Our result in step 2 gives a new justification for Pearl's Minimality condition.
To be more precise, we justify proceeding as if that condition were assumed. As Zhang (2013) points out, this Minimality condition is the crucial, untestable part of the Faithfulness condition, the part that is in need of a methodological justification; the extra content of Faithfulness, by contrast, is testable. We actually do more in step 2. To achieve (i)-(iv), stochastic convergence to the truth must be secured for some range of CBNs, must be sacrificed for some other range, and is optional for the remaining range. We determine those three ranges (in corollary 2). We also explore the extent to which our framework can be used to justify the Faithfulness assumption (in corollary 4).
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We debunk a myth in learning theory, that there is no learning theory without the possibility of statistical consistency. We counter it with a new, general methodology for developing learning theory.
• We apply the general methodology to a crucial case study: learning causal structures without making any assumption of simplicity, such as the Faithfulness condition or the like.
• Our result: This is the first time an assumption of simplicity in causal learning is justified learning-theoretically.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Definitions are in section 2; main results are stated in section 3; and a key lemma is proved in section 4 to show how our theory works. To declare the style in use: Emphasis is indicated by italics, while the terms to be defined are presented in boldface.
Definitions

Causation and Independence
Fix a finite set of variables, V = {X 1 , . . . , X K }. A possible causal structure of those variables is represented by a directed acyclic graph on V, written G = (V, →), where the binary relation X i → X j is understood to say that X i is an immediate cause of X j relative to V, or in short, that X i is a parent of X j . Following the genealogical terminology, if a variable X i is a parent of (a parent of a parent of ...) of a variable X j , say that X j is a descendant of X i . We will refer to G simply as a graph, dropping 'directed acyclic', because only directed acyclic graphs are considered here.
A graph G = (V, →) is said to be Markov to a joint probability distribution P of V if, for each variable X i ∈ V, X i is P -independent of its non-descendants given all of its parents, namely:
where PARENTS(X i ) are exactly all the parents of X i and Y 1 , . . . , Y j are arbitrary non-descendants of X i with respect to graph G. (For convenience, we count every variable as its own descendant.) The (causal) Markov condition says that the true causal graph is Markov to the true joint probability distribution, which is assumed throughout this paper.
Let V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 be disjoint subsets of variable set V. Understand V 1 ⊥ ⊥ V 2 | V 3 as the statement saying that V 1 and V 2 are independent given V 3 . A graph G is said to entail a conditional independence statement V 1 ⊥ ⊥ V 2 | V 3 if that statement holds with respect to every joint distribution that G is Markov to. Let I(G) denote the set of the conditional independence statements that G entails. Similarly, let I(P ) denote the set of the conditional independence statements that hold with respect to P . Then a well-known result is that G is Markov to P iff
I(G) ⊆ I(P ).
Say that G is faithful to P if I(G) = I(P ).
The (causal) Faithfulness condition says that the true causal graph is faithful to the true joint distribution in the above sense. A concept weaker than faithfulness is called (Pearl's) Minimality (Zhang 2013) . Suppose G is Markov to P . Say that G is minimal to P if there exists no graph G such that
The (causal) Minimality condition-in Pearl's version-says that the true causal graph is minimal to the true joint distribution in the above sense. The term 'minimal' can be understood this way. Suppose that P is the true joint probability distribution. So the conditional independence facts are those in I(P ). Let's try to explain (some of) those facts by postulating a causal structure G. Assuming the causal Markov condition, we have to postulate a causal graph G with I(G) ⊆ I(P ). So, of the conditional independence facts in I(P ), those included in I(G) are explained (namely, entailed) by the postulated causal structure G but those in I(P ) I(G) are left unexplained (yet)-at least they cannot be explained by causation if we postulate G. If we postulate a causal structure G that is minimal to P , it means that only a minimal set of conditional independence facts is left unexplained by causation, which sounds pretty good. In the limiting case that I(G) = I(P ), no conditional independence fact is left unexplained.
So the causal Minimality condition need not be understood as a metaphysical principle as to what our causal world is like. It can be taken as a methodological principle that recommends a preference for having our causal theory explain a maximal set of facts of conditional independence. The question is not whether this methodological principle sounds intuitively plausible and rhetorically compelling-we do not wish to deny that it does. The real question is whether it has anything to do with helping us learn the true causal structure, and, if so, how. Well, more definitions are needed before we can give an answer.
Causal Learning Problems
A causal state of the world on variable set V is a causal Bayesian network on V-or formally, an ordered pair (G, P ) such that graph G is Markov to joint distribution P on V. A causal learning problem is an ordered pair (V, S), where S is a set of causal states on V. The state space S represents the set of causal states compatible with the background assumption. When tackling a causal learning problem (V, S), we need to choose between learning methods and we want to evaluate their truth-finding performance in various possible causal states-and S works by specifying all the states against which we make such evaluations. The larger S is, the harder the learning problem is.
For example, a causal learning problem (V, S) typically assumes the Faithfulness condition, in the sense that its state space S contains only causal states (G, P ) with the property that G is faithful to P . Such states are called faithful states.
A causal learning problem (V, S) is said to assume only the Markov condition if S contains exactly all the causal states on V. The burden of this paper is to explain how it is possible to develop a learning theory for tackling such problems.
Learning Methods and Stochastic Convergence
A learning method is, roughly, a function that maps each possible data set to a causal hypothesis. The kinds of data and hypotheses in question are defined as follows. Two graphs G and G are said to be Markov equivalent if I(G) = I(G ). Each graph G generates a Markov equivalence class [G] , defined as the set of all the graphs that are Markov equivalent to G. Each such class [G] generates, in turn, a causal hypothesis:
which is formally identified with the set of all the causal states in S whose causal graphs are in [G] . These constitute the causal hypotheses considered in this paper. Let X = {X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X K } T be the column vector of the variables in V. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . be observations of instances of the causal system under study, where X n represents the observation of the n-th instance. Observations are assumed throughout this paper to be independent and identically distributed (IID). Namely, in each causal state (G, P ), it is assumed that, for each n ≥ 1:
. . .
A data set of sample size n is a realization (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of (X 1 , . . . , X n ). A learning method is a function H that maps each data set (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to a causal hypothesis H(x 1 , . . . , x n ). So, H(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a specific causal hypothesis, one that H outputs/accepts when it receives data set (x 1 , . . . , x n ). By way of contrast, H(X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a random causal hypothesis-a random variable denoting the causal hypothesis that H outputs given a random observation (X 1 , . . . , X n ) of sample size n. Consider a causal state s = (G, P ). Let H s denote the causal hypothesis true in s (namely, H G ). Let P s denote the sampling distribution true in s (namely, the ∞-fold probability measure generated by P under the IID assumption). A learning method H is said to converge to the truth in probability in a causal state s = (G, P ) if:
If possible, we would like to achieve a stronger, better mode of convergence. H is said to converge to the truth almost surely in causal state s = (G, P ) if:
This says that, with probability 1, H will eventually output the true causal hypothesis (with some sample size k) and continue to do so (with any sample size n ≥ k). For those who are unfamiliar with almost sure convergence, here is an instructive (albeit incomplete) way of understanding it. By the Borel-Cantelli lemma in probability theory, 1 the following is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a learning method H to converge almost surely to the truth in a state s = (G, P ):
This says that the error probabilities have to converge to zero quickly enough so that their sum is finite. All results of almost sure convergence in this paper are proved via the Borel-Cantelli lemma. So, in this paper, you can take "almost sure convergence" to simply mean the above inequality.
A learning method is to be evaluated in terms of two considerations. Where and how does convergence happen?
Where Does Convergence Happen?
Regarding where to converge, the highest standard to strive for is everywhere convergence, aka statistical consistency. Specifically, a learning method H for a learning problem (V, S) is said to achieve everywhere almost-sure convergence to the truth if H converges almost surely to the truth in every state contained in S. It is well-known that this standard is achievable if we assume the causal Faithfulness condition (so that S is narrowed down to contain only faithful causal states). But the problem is that, for the reason explained above, everywhere convergence is unachievable when we do not assume the Faithfulness condition or the like. Don't worry. When we cannot make it everywhere, see whether we can make it at least almost everywhere. We propose to employ a geometrical, topological conception of "almost everywhere". (Design consideration: Why adopt a topological conception rather than a measure-theoretic one? The answer is that the topological one that works better with local uniform convergence, which is a 1. For a review of this lemma, see, for example, Feller (1957: ch. 14 topological concept-more on this below.) We need a topology in order to be precise. It is easiest to generate it by a distance concept. The total variation distance between joint distributions P and P is defined by:
This induces a distance concept between causal states s = (G, P ) and s = (G , P ) in S:
S is understood as a topological space equipped with open balls of this form, where > 0:
Each causal hypothesis H ⊆ S is understood as a topological (sub-)space with open balls of the following form (as depicted in figure 1), where s ∈ H and > 0:
A subset S ⊆ H is said to be (topologically) negligible in H, aka nowhere dense, just in case, for every open ball B in H, there is some open ball B in H that is nested within B and disjoint from S. In that case, S has an open "hole" B in every local neighborhood B in H; it is like a slice of hyper Swiss cheese, incredibly full of open holes. A learning method H is said to have almost sure convergence to the truth secured almost everywhere if, for each causal hypothesis H, H converges to the truth almost surely in all states in H (construed as a topological space) except on some nowhere dense subset of H.
A learning method H is said to converge to the truth almost surely on a maximal domain of convergence if no learning method H converges to the truth almost surely in all states where H does and in strictly more states.
As mentioned in the introductory section, the idea of "negligible" alone can at most justify sacrificing truth-finding performance on some negligible set of causal states, but it says nothing about which. Adding convergence on a maximal domain turns out to help not much. We need to consider not just where convergence happens, but also how it does.
How Does Convergence Happen?
Let us consider how uniformly convergence happens. Say that H converges to the truth with global uniformity for learning problem (V, S) if:
Globally uniform convergence is great because, when it is achieved, we know how to control the sample size n to ensure low error probability across the board. But globally uniform convergence is unachievable for a causal learning problem that assumes only the Markov condition, for it is strong enough to imply statistical consistency, which is already unachievable. 2 Don't worry-a lower standard is not hard to imagine. If we cannot make it globally, let us see whether we can make it at least locally.
A learning method H is said to converge to the truth with adherent local uniformity in a state s if s has an open neighborhood B (s) ∩ H s with radius > 0 in the ambient space H s such that:
Revisit figure 1 for a picture of such a local neighborhood. Adherent local uniformity in state s means that error probability in state s can be made not just low but stably so-stably under small perturbations of the underlying joint probability distribution (but without modifying the causal structure in a way that turns hypothesis H s from a truth to a falsehood). Say that H converges to the truth with adherent local uniformity (simpliciter) if H converges to the truth with adherent local uniformity in every causal state in S in which it converges to the truth almost surely.
Main Results
Theorem 1 Let (V, S) be a causal learning problem that assumes only the Markov condition and involves only categorical variables (which by definition can take only finitely many values). Then:
1. There exists a learning method for problem (V, S) that achieves this joint mode of convergence to the truth:
(a) almost sure convergence to the truth secured almost everywhere, (b) with adherent local uniformity, (c) on a maximal domain of almost sure convergence to the truth.
2. Every learning method for (V, S) satisfying at least (a)+(b) has this property: converging almost surely to the truth in a causal state s ∈ S only if s is minimal (as if the causal Minimality condition were assumed).
Theorem 1 shows that any learning method that achieves the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c) must sacrifice convergence to the truth in any non-minimal causal state. But is it required to converge in every minimal causal state? No, that is not required, because that is not achievable. For there exist 2. Worse, globally uniform convergence remains unachievable even if we add the causal Faithfulness assumption (Robins et al. 2003) .
minimal causal states with the same distribution but Markov inequivalent graphs. Instead, we can establish the following with an easy adaption of the argument for theorem 1. Call a causal state (G, P ) u-minimal (unambiguously minimal) if G is minimal to P and every graph minimal to P is Markov equivalent to G. 3
Corollary 2 Continuing from theorem 1, we have:
1. Every learning method for (V, S) that achieves the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c) converges almost surely to the truth in all u-minimal causal states in S.
2. For every causal state s ∈ S that is minimal but not u-minimal, some but not all learning methods for (V, S) that achieve (a)+(b)+(c) converge almost surely to the truth in s.
Thus, to achieve at least the standard we propose, convergence to the truth must be sacrificed in all non-minimal states, must be secured in all u-minimal states, and is optional for the remaining states. We actually prove the existential claim, clause 1 in theorem 1, by constructing a learning method H that satisfies not just (a)+(b)+(c) but is also based on a strongly consistent test T of conditional independence (so, by definition, T is a learning method whose outputs converge almost surely to the correct truth values of all the conditional independence statements about V in every causal state in S). Understand H as a learner who has opinions about causal structure (in light of data); understand T as a learner who has opinions about conditional independence. So H plus T can be understood as a learner who has opinions about both causal structure and conditional independence and, hence, about whether the causal Minimality condition holds. This idea leads to a strengthening of the preceding theorem:
Corollary 3 Continuing from Theorem 1, we have:
1. There exists a learning method for problem (V, S) based on a strongly consistent test of all the conditional independence statements involved while achieving the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c).
2. For any such learning method H based on such a test T of conditional independence, the following holds with probability 1 in every (minimal or non-minimal) causal state in S:
There exists a positive integer n such that, when the sample size grows beyond n, H and T will always output/accept some statements that jointly entail the causal Minimality condition.
(So H is almost destined to actually accept the causal Minimality condition.)
The above results can be extended to provide a "conditional" justification for the causal Faithfulness condition. If you want to make an assumption that goes beyond Markov and IID, we recommend that you only make a statistically testable one-so that your acceptance of it need not be a faith. An example is what we call the Quasi-faithfulness condition, which says that the true joint distribution is such that some graph is faithful to it (whether or not that graph is the true causal structure). This assumption is obviously weaker than Faithfulness. It is statistically testable because it has nothing to do with causality but only talks about the true distribution and its conditional independence relations, and also because conditional independence can be tested by a statistically consistent test. Now, a joint distribution P is said to be quasi-faithful if some graph is faithful to P ; a causal state (G, P ) is said to be quasi-faithful if P is quasi-faithful (it does not matter what G is like). A causal learning problem (V, S) is said to assume only the Markov and Quasi-faithfulness conditions if its state space S is the set of all the causal states on V that are quasi-faithful. Then, when we are willing to accept the Quasi-faithfulness condition because it has survived a good statistical test, there is a justification for the causal Faithfulness condition:
Corollary 4 Let (V, S) be a causal inference problem that involves only categorical variables in V and assume only the Markov and Quasi-faithfulness conditions. We have:
1. There exists a learning method for (V, S) that achieves this joint mode of convergence to the truth:
2. Any such learning method has this property: converging almost surely to the truth in a causal state s in S if, and only if, s is faithful.
Furthermore:
1'. There exists a learning method for (V, S) based on a strongly consistent test of all the conditional independence statements involved while achieving the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c).
2'. For any such learning method H based on such a test T of conditional independence, the following holds with probability 1 in every (faithful or unfaithful) causal state in S:
There exists a positive integer n such that, when the sample size grows beyond n, H and T will always output (namely, accept) some statements that jointly entail the causal Faithfulness condition.
How It Works: Proof of a Crucial Lemma
The full proofs of the results are given in the appendices, but a crucial lemma is worth highlighting here, whose proof explains why it is a bad idea to converge to the truth in a causal state that violates the causal Minimality condition. The following presents the lemma and the proof. Here are some preliminary concepts. A causal learning problem (V, S) is said to be closed under minimal graphs if, for any causal state (G, P ) in S, (G , P ) is in S for at least one graph G on V such that I(G) ⊆ I(G ) and G is minimal to P . (V, S) is said to be closed under probability distributions if, for any causal state (G, P ) in S, (G, P ) is in S for any joint probability distribution P on V to which G is Markov. Let H be a learning method and H a causal hypothesis in problem (V, S). The domain of H's almost sure convergence to the truth in H is defined as the set of all the causal states in H in which H converges almost surely to the truth. Then we have:
Lemma 5 Let (V, S) be a causal learning problem, H a learning method for it. (It does not matter whether the variables involved are categorical, discrete, or continuous.) Suppose that:
(I) problem (V, S) is closed under minimal graphs and under probability distributions, (II) H is such that, for each causal hypothesis H ⊆ S, the domain of H's almost sure convergence to the truth in H is dense and open in H.
Then H converges almost surely to the truth in a causal state s ∈ S only if s is minimal-as if H were designed by assuming the causal Minimality condition.
Closure property (I) applies to any causal learning problem studied in this paper. Convergence property (II) applies to any learning method that achieves these two modes of almost sure convergence to the truth: (a) "almost everywhere" and (b) "adherent local uniformity". It is because the former mode (a) implies dense domains of convergence and the latter mode (b) implies open domains of convergence. So the second clause of theorem 1 follows from the lemma 5.
To sum up: To achieve the best achievable mode of convergence to the truth, we submit that a causal learning method should achieve at least (a)+(b), which implies having a dense and open domain of convergence to the truth in each causal hypothesis, which by lemma 5 incurs a necessary cost: having convergence to the truth sacrificed in all non-minimal causal states. Let us explain why it is a necessary cost.
Proof of Lemma 5. Throughout this proof, by convergence we mean almost sure convergence. Suppose that learning problem (V, S) satisfies the stated closure property (I), and that learning method H satisfies the stated convergence property (II). Suppose, for reductio, that H converges to the truth in some non-minimal causal state s 0 = (G, P ) ∈ S. By the openness of domain of convergence, H converges to the truth in every causal state in B (s 0 ) ∩ H G , which is an open neighborhood of s 0 in H G with radius > 0. From s 0 let's construct causal states s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 in three steps, respectively:
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
• Step 1. By applying closure under minimal graphs to state s 1 = (G, P ), there exists a minimal causal state s 1 = (G , P ) ∈ S with I(G) ⊆ I(G ). We have thus constructed s 1 .
• Step 2. Since G is not minimal to P but G is, we have that G and G are not Markov equivalent. So hypotheses H G and H G are incompatible; they are disjoint topological spaces. In topological space H G , causal state s 1 has an open neighborhood B (s 1 ) ∩ H G with radius > 0. Then, by the denseness of domain of convergence, that open neighborhood B (s 1 ) ∩ H G contains at least one casual state in which H converges to the truth-now, choose such a causal state s 2 = (G , P ). We have thus constructed s 2 .
• Step 3. Take causal state s 2 = (G , P ), replace the graph therein by G to construct an ordered pair s 3 = (G, P ). Argue as follows that s 3 is a causal state in H G . Note that G is indeed Markov to P because I(G) ⊆ I(G ) ⊆ I(P ), where the first subset relation follows from the construction of G and the second subset relation follows from the fact that s 2 = (G , P )
is in S and all states in S satisfy the Markov condition. Since G is Markov to P , by closure under probability distributions we have that s 3 = (G, P ) is in S, and hence that s 3 = (G, P ) is in H G . We have thus constructed s 3 .
Causal state s 3 has two features (which will lead to a bug). First, s 3 is in the open neighborhood B (s 0 ) ∩ H G of state s 0 in space H G , because:
Second, s 3 is a causal state in which learning method H converges to H G , because H converges to H G (the truth) in causal state s 2 and because s 2 and s 3 share the same joint distribution (and hence the same sampling distribution). So, s 3 is both a causal state in B (s 0 ) ∩ H G and one in which H converges to a falsehood, for causal hypothesis H G is false in s 3 = (G, P ). Therefore, H fails to converge to the truth in every causal state in B (s 0 ) ∩ H G -contradiction.
While the above provides an illuminating proof for the second clause of theorem 1, the proof for the first clause-the existential claim-is quite technical (and about eight pages long). But here is a sketch of the strategy we use. We begin with appendix A.1, in which Meek's (1995) lemmas about Lebesgue-measure-zero sets of causal states are transformed into lemmas about nowhere dense sets, which are essential to proving results about almost everywhere convergence. Then, in appendix A.2, we extend Györfi and Walk's (2012) work on a strongly consistent, non-parametric test of conditional independence. We basically show that their test also achieves adherently locally uniform convergence. With such a nice test T for all the conditional independence statements involved, we use it to construct causal learning methods in appendix A.3. The crux is to design a "good" function F that outputs a causal hypothesis when it receives some information provided by the test T of conditional independence in use. When F is well designed, the result will be the existence of a learning method F • T that achieves all the three modes of convergence mentioned in theorem 1.
Conclusion
Without assuming the causal Faithfulness condition or the like, causal learning problems are notoriously hard-so hard that statistical consistency is unachievable. In reaction, we have proposed a new methodology for developing learning theory:
Methodology. If you value statistical consistency and tackle an empirical problem that is too hard to allow for statistical consistency, please do not follow the old, standard approach in assuming some condition C in order to ease the problem. The right way to proceed, or at least the first thing to try, is the following:
1. Recognize that, although statistical consistency is epistemically desirable, it is only one of the many modes of convergence to the truth that are also epistemically desirable.
2. Look for the modes that, unlike statistical consistency, can be achieved.
3. Evaluate learning methods in terms of the best achievable mode.
That is, we should look for what can be achieved, and achieve the best we can. Then see whether the following can be justified as a necessary means for achieving the best we can have: proceeding as if condition C were accepted as true.
We have applied the above methodology to the problem of learning the structure of a causal Bayesian network over categorical variables-learning it from non-experimental data and under the assumption of only the IID and Markov conditions. The result is a learning-theoretic justification of proceeding as if (Pearl's) Minimality assumption were accepted. There is a similar justification for the Faithfulness assumption when we are willing to work under an additional, statistically testable assumption (that has survived a severe test). This is the first time assumptions of simplicity in causal learning are justified learning-theoretically. This result significantly improves the style of justification that has been attempted in the causal learning literature (e.g., Spirtes et al. 1993; Meek 1995) .
For it explains why we have to proceed as if such a condition of simplicity were accepted-why it is mandatory rather than merely optional. The above result concerns causal learning problems that involve only categorical variables. We conjecture that it can be (easily) generalized to cover some other causal learning problems, such as problems in which all causal states (G, P ) under consideration are linear Gaussian structural equation models. But that will have to be addressed in another paper. We also hope that theorem 1 can be generalized to any causal learning problem (V, S) in which the variable set V is allowed to contain discrete or continuous variables and the state space S is the set of all the causal states on V. Our hope is motivated by two observations. First, the key lemma 5 is applicable to not just categorical variables but also continuous ones. Second, in such a general setting, the state space S can be too large to be captured by an n-dimensional Euclidean space (of parameters) and, hence, it makes no sense to talk about negligibility as "Lebesgue measure zero" (which is popularized in the causal learning community by Spirtes et al. 1993 and Meek 1995) . But it still makes sense to talk about negligibility as "nowhere sense", the concept adopted here.
From hindsight, the new methodology we propose can be regarded as following a great tradition in learning theory. PAC learning theory (Valiant 1984 ) studies a learning criterion that implies at least the following modes of convergence: (i) weak stochastic convergence (namely, convergence in probability), (ii) everywhere convergence on the space of all relevant possibilities, (iii) globally uniform convergence.
There are learning problems that are too hard to achieve (i)-(iii). But learning theorists do not pile on assumptions to make them easy. They keep hard problems as they are and seek a lower learning criterion by dropping (iii), as manifested in almost every learning theory textbook after the chapter/section on PAC learning. 4 The rationale is obvious: We do not need to achieve what we cannot achieve; we only need to, and ought to, achieve the best we can. This guideline is actually a tradition in learning theory that can be traced to the genesis of learning theory from computability theory in the 1960's. Computability theory studies a learning criterion that may be called solution by an effective procedure, which implies at least the following modes of convergence: (i) deterministic convergence (or, to be very precise, non-stochastic convergence), (ii) everywhere convergence on the space of all relevant possibilities, (iii) monotonic convergence of a kind that requires halting in finitely many steps. Gold (1965) and Putnam (1965) try to address very hard learning problems, too hard to achieve all those three. What they propose is, in effect, to drop (iii) and retain the first two, obtaining a lower learning criterion known as identification in the limit. The result is the creation of a branch of learning theory known as algorithmic/formal learning theory (for inductive inference).
Lesson: There are various modes of convergence to the truth (or the correct learning target). Some combinations correspond to higher learning criteria (or epistemic ideals) than others. Learning theorists should not, and do not, grab one and declare it "the" learning criterion. Instead, a great tradition in learning theory is that, when we are given a hard learning problem, the first thing to do is not to pile on assumptions to make it easy, but to look for what can be achieved and achieve the best we can-the highest achievable learning criterion, the best joint mode of convergence achievable for the given learning problem.
Appendix A. Proofs
The proofs of theorem 1 and its corollaries are provided in appendix A.4. But before that we need a long series of lemmas, proved in appendices A.1-A.3.
A.1. Unfaithfulness Is Nowhere Dense
Throughout this subsection, variable set V is assumed to contain only categorical variables.
Lemma 6 (Meek 1995) For any graph G on V, and for any conditional independence statement U ⊥ ⊥ V | W about V, we have that U ⊥ ⊥ V | W is represented by a polynomial f U⊥ ⊥V | W in the sense that, for any joint distribution P that is Markov to G, U ⊥ ⊥ V | W holds with respect to P iff the parameters of P with respect to G satisfy the polynomial equation f U⊥ ⊥V | W = 0.
Lemma 7 For any graph G on V, in the parameter space of all the joint distributions of V that are Markov to G, the Euclidean distance and the total variation distance define the same topology.
Proof It is routine to show that the Euclidean distance defines as the same topology as the L 1 distance (aka the city block distance) does. Then it suffice to observe that, since each variable involved can take only finitely many values, the L 1 distance and the total variation distance differ only by a factor of 2 and, hence, define the same topology.
Lemma 8 Let S be the set of all the solutions to a polynomial equation in n real variables. Then R n S is open with respect to the Euclidean topology.
Proof The proof is routine in real analysis but included here for your reference. Suppose that S is the set of all the solutions to a polynomial equation, say f = 0, in n real variables. Note that f is a continuous function. So the application of its inverse f −1 to the open set R {0} results in an open set, namely f −1 [R {0}], which is equal to R n S.
Proposition 9 For each causal hypothesis H G (with graph G on V) and for each conditional independence statement U ⊥ ⊥ V | W (about V), the set of all the causal states (G', P') in H G for which U ⊥ ⊥ V | W does not hold is an open set in H G .
Proof Immediate from the preceding lemmas in this section.
Lemma 10 The set of the solutions to a polynomial equation in n real variables is either trivial (i.e. identical to R n ) or nowhere dense in R n with respect to the Euclidean topology.
Proof The proof is routine in real analysis but included here for your reference. Let f be a polynomial in n real variables. Let S ⊆ R n be the set of solutions to f = 0. Suppose that S is not trivial. It suffices to show that S is nowhere dense. Let B (x) be an arbitrary open ball in R n . It suffices to show that there exists a radius > 0 that is small enough to ensure that the open ball B (x ) is both included in B (x) and disjoint from S. Now, argue as follows that B (x) S is nonempty: if B (x) S is empty, then all partial derivatives of f at x is zero, which implies that the Taylor series of f at x is identically zero, which implies that f is identically zero, which implies that the solution set S of f is trivial-contradiction. So B (x) S is nonempty. Choose a point x ∈ B (x) S. Then there exists a radius > 0 that is small enough to ensure that the open ball B (x ) is both included in B (x) and disjoint from S, where the latter follows from the fact that R n S is open (by lemma 8). This finishes the proof.
The following lemma is one of the hardest ones to prove; fortunately, Meek(1995) has proved it for us:
Lemma 11 (Meek 1995) For any graph G on variable set V, there exists a joint distribution P that is faithful to G.
Lemma 12 Let G be a graph on variable set V. Let D G be the set of all the joint distributions that are Markov to G. Let D * G be the set of all those in
Proof D G , as the topological space of the joint distributions that are Markov to G equipped the total variation topology, is homeomorphic to the corresponding parameter spaceD G . So D * G is homeomorphic toD * G , defined as the subset of the parameter space that contains exactly the solutions to the following equation: φ∈Φ f φ = 0, where Φ is the set of all the conditional independence statements about V that are not entailed by G. But, since all f φ are polynomials, their product φ∈Φ f φ = 0 is also a polynomial. So, by lemma 10,D * G is either trivial or nowhere dense inD G . But it is not trivial by lemma 11, so it is nowhere dense inD G . Then, by homeomorphism, D * G is nowhere dense in D G .
Proposition 13 Let G be a graph on variable set V. Let H G be the set of all the causal states whose graphs are Markov equivalent to G. Let H * G be the set of all the unfaithful states in H G . Then H * G is nowhere dense in H G . And, hence, so is any subset of H * G -such as the set of all states in H G that are not minimal, and the set of all states in H G that are not u-minimal.
Proof In terms of topology, H G and D G differ only in that the former adds some topologically equivalent points. Similarly for H * G and D * G . So, since D * G is nowhere dense in D G by the preceding lemma 12, we have that H * G is nowhere dense in H G .
Proposition 14 Let G be a graph on variable set V. Let H quasi G be the set of all the quasi-faithful causal states whose graphs are Markov equivalent to G. Let H * G be the set of all the unfaithful states in H G . Then H * G is nowhere dense in H G .
Proof Note that H * G is nowhere dense in H G by the preceding proposition 13. It follows that So H * G is nowhere dense in
results from the ambient space H G by deleting points only in H * G (namely, the non-quasi-faithful states in H * G ). This finishes the proof.
A.2. Testing Conditional Independence
Lemma 15 (Hoeffding's Inequality for Empirical Measures) Let P n be the empirical measure obtained by IID sampling from a categorical distribution P . Then, for any > 0 and any sample size n:
where ∆ is the total variation distance, and K is a constant denoting the number of the categories of P , i.e. the number of the possible values that x can take.
Proof It is routine to prove this result in probability theory. Here is one of the standard forms of Hoeffding's Inequality:
Let X be the range of x. So the set of the relevant propositions/events is 2 X . Let 2 X be a subset of 2 X constructed as follows: for every pair (A, A ) of sets that form a partition of X , choose exactly one of the two sets, A or A , and put it in 2 X . Note that the cardinality of 2 X is 2 K−1 . For each proposition A ∈ 2 X , apply Hoeffding's inequality to | P n (A) − E[ P n (A)]|, which is equal to | P n (A) − P (A)|, so we have:
Then we have:
So P ∆( P n , P ) < ≥ 1 − 2 K e −2n 2 , as required.
Proposition 16 Every conditional independence statement U ⊥ ⊥ V | W that involves only categorical variables has a test T that achieves:
1. strong consistency (i.e. almost sure convergence to the truth, secured everywhere), 2. adherent local uniformity, namely that if T converges almost surely to the truth to a state in hypothesis H then T does uniformly on some open neighborhood of that state in H, for any hypothesis H being the set of all the states where U ⊥ ⊥ V | W holds or the set of all the states where U ⊥ ⊥ V | W does not hold.
Proof Let U, V, W be three disjoint sets of categorical variables. We are going to test the hypothesis that U and V are independent given W. Given an arbitrary probability distribution P on U ∪ V ∪ W, define the following "L 1 -distance" of P from the independence of U and V given W:
where u, v, w range over the possible values of U, V, W, respectively. Let P n be the empirical distribution (namely, frequency counts) of n observations. (So P n is a random probability distribution on U ∪ V ∪ W.) It suffices to prove that the existence claim is witnessed by the following test: 5
• Accept the hypothesis of conditional independence if
• Reject that hypothesis otherwise.
We will need to bound |L 1 (P ) − L 1 (Q)|, where P and Q are two arbitrary probability distributions on U ∪ V ∪ W. Bound it as follows: Györfi and Walk (2012) studies. Our proofs of the bounds below are also inspired by their proofs of the bounds that they used to establish the existence of a strong (i.e. almost sure) universal (i.e. distribution-free, non-parametric) consistent test of conditional independence. Although adherently locally uniform convergence is not what Györfi and Walk (2012) studies, it can be conveniently established by the technique they developed for other purposes.
This test is inspired by the test that
We are going to bound the first and second terms, respectively. Bound the first term as follows:
(Recall that ∆(P, Q) denotes the total variation distance between P and Q.) The second term can be bounded in the same way:
So |L 1 (P ) − L 1 (Q)| can be bounded neatly as follows:
Let P be the (unknown) true distribution under the null hypothesis that the conditional independence relation holds. Let P n be the random empirical distribution generated from P with sample size n. By inequality (1) and lemma 15, we have that the following inequality
holds with probability at least 1 − 2 K e −2n
32 . With this result, almost sure convergence to the truth follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma and the fact that
32 < ∞. Convergence with adherent local uniformity follows from the fact that the above probability bound is distribution free under the null hypothesis. Now, turn to how the test performs under the alternative hypothesis that the conditional independence relation does not hold. Let P * be the (unknown) true distribution under the alternative hypothesis. So L 1 (P * ) > 0. Let P an arbitrary distribution in the open ball B L 1 (P * )/32 (P * ). Let P n be the random empirical distribution generated from P with sample size n. By inequality (1) and lemma 15, we have the following result: For any n large enough to guarantee that 1 4 L 1 (P * ) ≥ 1 n 1/4 , the following inequality
holds with probability at least 1
. With this result, almost sure convergence follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma and the fact that
L 1 (P * ) 2 < ∞. Convergence with adherent local uniformity follows from the fact that, for each P * under the alternative hypothesis, the above probability bound holds for every P in the open ball B L 1 (P * )/32 (P ).
A.3. Construction of Learning Methods
Given a finite set V of variables, the following is an algorithm for constructing learning methods that will be shown to witness the existence claims made in this paper.
Step 1. Let each conditional independence statement about V be associated with a test of it that achieves strong universal consistency and adherent local uniformity (thanks to proposition 16). Combine those tests into a single "super" test T , which maps each data set (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to a set S = T (x 1 , . . . , x n ), defined as the set of all the conditional independence statements accepted by their associated tests given data set (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
Step 2. Consider all causal hypotheses about V, and order them linearly into a sequence
Step 3. Construct a function F that maps each set S of conditional independence statements about V to the first hypothesis H G i in the sequence such that I(G i ) ⊆ S.
Step 4. Construct learning method H = F • T .
Lemma 17 There is a learning method that can be constructed from the above procedure. Furthermore, any such learning method H = F • T has the following properties:
1. Whenever F (S) = H G , then G is minimal to S-namely, there is no graph G on V such that
2. Whenever F (S) = H G , then F (S ) = H G for any set S with I(G) ⊆ S ⊆ S.
Proof
The existence of such a learning method follows from the following three facts. First, there exists a "super" test T of conditional independence with the property required in step 1 (by proposition 16). Second, there exists a sequence of causal hypotheses with the property required in step 2 (which is obvious because there are only finitely many hypotheses to be ordered). Finally, function F is well-defined (because, as an elementary result in the theory of Bayesian networks, for each set S of conditional independence statements about V, there exists a graph G on V such that I(G) = ∅ ⊆ S). Consider an arbitrary learning method H that can be constructed from the above procedure: H = F • T , with a function F , a test T , and a sequence of causal hypotheses H G 1 , H G 2 , . . . , H G k satisfying all the required properties. Argue for the two clauses as follows.
To establish clause 1, suppose for reductio that F (S) = H G but G is not minimal to S, namely there is a graph G on V such that I(G) ⊂ I(G ) ⊆ S. Since the sequence H G 1 , H G 2 , . . . , H G k contains all causal hypotheses, we have that H G = H G j and H G = H G i for some j, i ≤ k. So, to rewrite what we have already had:
by the requirement in step 2 of the procedure we have that i < j. That is, H G i is a hypothesis that occurs earlier than H G j does in the sequence. But note that I(G i ) ⊆ S. So, by the requirement in step 3, F (S) is not H G j but must be either H G i or some earlier hypothesis in the sequencecontradiction. This establishes clause 1.
To establish clause 2, suppose that F (S) = H G and that I(G) ⊆ S ⊆ S. It suffices to show that F (S ) = H G . Since the sequence H G 1 , H G 2 , . . . , H G k contains all causal hypotheses, we have that F (S) = H G = H G i and I(G) = I(G i ) for some index i of the sequence. Since F (S) = H G i , by the requirement in step 3 we have:
Since I(G) = I(G i ) and I(G) ⊆ S (by hypothesis), we have:
Since (i) holds and S ⊆ S (by hypothesis), we have:
So, by (ii) and (iii) and the requirement in step 3, we have that F (S ) = H G i . It follows that F (S ) = H G . This establishes clause 2.
Lemma 18 For every u-minimal causal state s = (G, P ) and every learning method H = F • T that can be constructed from the above procedure, we have that F (I(P )) = H G .
Proof Immediate from the requirements in steps 2 and 3.
Lemma 19 For every minimal causal state s = (G, P ), there is a learning method H = F • T that can be constructed from the above procedure such that F (I(P )) = H G .
Proof Let s = (G, P ) be any minimal causal state, and let M(P ) denote the set of all causal hypotheses whose graphs are minimal to I(P ). Since s is minimal, H G ∈ M(P ), and for every H G = H G ∈ M(P ), I(G) ⊂ I(G ). Hence, there is a linear order of all causal hypotheses about V, H G 1 , H G 2 , . . . , H G k , such that (i) I(G i ) ⊃ I(G j ) implies i < j, (ii) H G = H Gm for some index m, and for every H G = H G ∈ M(P ), H G = H G l for some index l and m < l. Thanks to (i), this linear order can be used in step 2 of the above procedure, which, by the argument of Lemma 17, yields a learning method H = F • T such that F (I(P )) ∈ M(P ). Then, because of (ii) and the requirement of step 3 of the procedure, it follows that F (I(P )) = H Gm = H G .
Proposition 20 Let (V, S) be a causal inference problem that assumes only the Markov condition and involves only categorical variables. There is a learning method for (V, S) that can be constructed from the above procedure and, hence, is based on a strongly consistent test of all the conditional independence statements about V. Furthermore, any such learning method achieves this joint mode of convergence to the truth:
Proof Let H be a learning method that can be constructed from the above procedure: H = F • T . We will first prove the easy part, that H has convergence properties (a) and (c), then take care of property (b), which is harder to prove.
To prove property (a), consider an arbitrary causal hypothesis H G . H converges almost surely to the truth in every u-minimal state in H G , thanks to lemma 18 and the strong consistency of T (which is required by construction step 1). So H fails to converge almost surely to the truth only in states in H G that are not u-minimal, but those states form a nowhere dense subset of H G (thanks to proposition 13). So property (a) follows.
To prove property (b), consider an arbitrary learning method H that converges almost surely to the truth in all states where H does. It suffices to show that H does not converge almost surely to the truth in more states than H does. Let (G, P ) ∈ S be a state in which H converges almost surely to the truth. It suffices to show that H converges almost surely to the truth in (G, P ). Recall that H = F • T , and by construction step 3, that F (I(P )) = H G for some graph G Markov to P . So (G , P ) is a state in S. It follows that H converges almost surely to the truth in state (G , P )-and, hence, H does, too, by hypothesis. To sum up, H converges almost surely to the truth in both states (G, P ) and (G , P ), which share the same sampling distribution. So H G = H G . It follows that, since H converges almost surely to the truth in state (G , P ), it does in state (G, P ), as desired.
To show that property (b) applies to H = F • T , suppose that H converges almost surely to the truth in a causal state s = (G, P ) ∈ S. So H G = F (I(P )). Then, by lemma 17, G is minimal to P . We are going to argue for the following: 
To establish (i), let I V denote the set of all the conditional independence statements about V, and it suffices to find such a desired radius by applying proposition 9 to each conditional independence statement in finite set I V I(P ) (and using the fact that open sets are closed under finite intersection). To put result ( Since F (I(P )) = H G , we have: I(G) ⊆ T (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ⊆ I(P ) implies F (T (x 1 , . . . , x n )) = H G (by the second clause of lemma 17). It follows that inf s ∈B (s)∩H G P s F (T (X 1 , . . . , X n )) = H G → 1 as n → ∞ .
So learning method H, which is F • T , converges stochastically to the truth uniformly on this open neighborhood B (s) ∩ H G of state s in space H G . The stochastic convergence in question is almost sure convergence, because test T is strongly consistent ("strongly" = "almost surely"). This completes the proof of property (b), adherent local uniformity.
A.4. Proving Theorem 1 and Corollaries 2-4
Proof of Theorem 1 Clause 1 follows directly from Proposition 20. Clause 2, as we explained in Section 4, follows from Lemma 5 and the following obvious facts: (i) the causal learning problem is closed under minimal graphs and under probability distributions in the sense defined in Section 4; (ii) almost everywhere convergence on H entails that the domain of convergence in H is dense; and (iii) convergence with adherent local uniformity entails that the domain of convergence in H is open.
Proof of Corollary 2
We first establish clause 1. Let H be any learning method for causal learning problem (V, S) that achieves the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c). Suppose for reductio that there is a uminimal causal state (G, P ) in which H does not converge almost surely to the truth, i.e., does not converge to H G . Consider then method H that rides on H as follows: Run a strongly consistent "super" test T of (the conjunction of) the conditional independence statements in I(P ) (which is available by Proposition 16). If T accepts the conjunction, returns H G ; otherwise, apply H. We now show that H converges almost surely to the truth in every causal state where H does and in strictly more states. Let (G * , P * ) be any causal state in which H converges almost surely to the truth. By clause 2 of Theorem 1, (G * , P * ) is a minimal causal state. Now, either I(P * ) = I(P ) or not. In the former case, since (G, P ) is u-minimal, it follows that H G * = H G . Since T is strongly consistent, H also converges almost surely to the truth in (G * , P * ). In the latter case, T almost surely converges to rejection, and so H almost surely converges to the same answer as H does. Hence, H converges almost surely to the truth in every causal state where H does. Moreover, thanks to T , H converges almost surely to the truth in state (G, P ), where H does not by supposition. Therefore, H does not achieve convergence to truth on a maximal domain-contradiction. This establishes clause 1.
To establish clause 2, consider any causal state (G 1 , P ) that is minimal but not u-minimal. Since it is not u-minimal, there exists G 2 such that H G 1 = H G 2 and (G 2 , P ) is also a minimal causal state. By Lemma 19 and Proposition 20, there is a learning method H 1 that achieves the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c) and converges almost surely to the truth in (G 1 , P ), and a learning method H 2 that achieves the joint mode (a)+(b)+(c) and converges almost surely to the truth in (G 2 , P ). Since H G 1 = H G 2 , H 2 does not converge almost surely to the truth in (G 1 , P ). Clause 2 follows.
Proof of Corollary 3 Again, clause 1 follows directly from Proposition 20. For clause 2, consider any causal state (G, P ). By essentially the same argument for clause 1 of Corollary 2, there is a minimal causal state (G , P ) in which H converges almost surely to the true causal hypothesis H G . On the other hand, since T is strongly consistent, in (G , P ) it converges almost surely to accepting the statements in I(P ). Since (G, P ) and (G , P ) share the same sampling distribution, H and T have the exact same performance in (G, P ) as in (G , P ). The desired conclusion follows.
Proof of Corollary 4
The content of this corollary parallels the content of theorem 1 plus its corollaries 2 and 3. The proof is similar, too. So we highlight the differences.
The proof of clause 1 is the same as the the proof of clause 1 of theorem 1, except that, instead of using proposition 13 (that the set of unfaithful states is nowhere dense in the set of all states given each causal hypothesis), we need to use proposition 14 (that the set of unfaithful states is nowhere dense in the set of all quasi-faithful states given each causal hypothesis). To prove clause 2, note that the state space S contains only quasi-faithful states. So we have:
(i) Every state in S is either non-minimal or u-minimal.
(ii) All non-minimal states in S are unfaithful states. Convergence to the truth must be sacrificed in such states, for the same reason employed to prove the second clause of theorem 1), and the fact that the current state space S still has the required closure properties to make the crucial lemma 5 applicable.
(iii) All u-minimal states in S are faithful state. Convergence to the truth must be secured in such states, for the same reason employed to prove corollary 2.
So convergence to the truth is secured in a state s ∈ S if and only if s is faithful. Clauses 1' follows immediately from clause 1 and the fact that all the existential claims in the above are established by constructing learning methods based on a strongly consistent test of all the conditional independence statements involved. Clause 2' can be proved the same way corollary 3 is proved.
